Not performing reduction is a form of reduction. [13.07.2014]

Deleuze and Turing self-test

Reading Deleuze's Difference and Repetition. As they would say in information technologies, his texts are write-only. Essentially, you produce this kind of texts, when you already are thinking as Deleuze. Reading his books is a Turing self-test: if I understand it, I am Deleuze of sorts. The trumpet produces trumpet sounds. Deleuze produces Deleuze texts. Deleuze is a production machine of texts that were not meant to be read. They were not written to be understood, but forensics to be performed on them in attempt to reconstruct the operation of Deleuze-machine.

(Strangely, we often call a machine something that produces output that is not connected to its internal workings in some intentional and tractable way. The bird shit is linked to its digestion. The human speach has communicative or emotional component. I don't know much about him, but possibly Deleuze wanted to be perceived or self-identified as a machine, partly due to his and Guattari's neo-modernist ideas and partly due to his life-long debilitating illness.)

Once you keep in mind what he means, it all makes perfect, lucid, and highly pragmatic sense. Then, two pages later you lose traction again and keep skidding on the next few. You may say it's because the man is above your grade. But then - sometimes - he gives examples. Examples are there to make things more clear, if less theoretical. However, say, the illustrative or argumentative force of most of his abundant examples from mathematics is lost, because the basic mathematical facts are obfuscated with convoluted tortured words.

As Wittgenstein said: what can be said at all, can be said clearly. But Deleuze did not like Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein did not mind. He was dead by then. [22.08.2015]

Artificial intelligence singularity will be achieved unnoticed. It will not be passing Turing test. It will be Wittgenstein's lion: Wenn ein Loewe sprechen koennte, wir koennten ihn nicht verstehen. We would not even understand that he is speaking. [19.04.2018]

Suppose, Chomsky says: only the language of the individual whose mind can generate utterances (I-Language) is worth studying in linuguistics. Because here is the mind and here is the language it produces. No mind - no language. With the tacit assumption that somehow there are minds and they directly produce language with nothing in between. Because we can depart from the principle of isolation: you need only mind (physiologically wired with language-learning capability) to speak a language. And (I suppose) since we have privileged access to our minds, we can immediately observe that words and phrases are produced right in our minds. However, this immediacy proves no more than saying: I see a tree therefore there is nothing between me and the tree. Rather there is nothing between me and the tree that would prevent me from seeing it or between me and the orchestra that prevents me from hearing it. However, today we know that there should be something between me and the orchestra: the air, which I don't see or hear, but without which I would not hear anything. The perceived immediate connection between mind and speech is meaningless in the causal sense. The gap between them can be "material" or semiotic: an extra medium between mind and speech (e.g. of social nature) can transcend confines of an individual as well as the isolation not necessarily guarantees the adequate semiotic level: brain as a collection of cells or of atoms seems to be necessary and sufficient for speech, but it leaves too big a causality gap that would prevent a meaningful linguistic inquiry. [26.07.2014]

Suppose (as one book suggests) that in Wittgenstein's builder language game the helper does not understand the builder's language. Moreover, the builder's language sounds garbled to him. All what the helper has learned is that when the builder says something that sounds like a command, he better bring something: a block or a slab.

The builder shouts 'slab', but the helper may bring a block instead. Sometimes the helper brings a slab, but when the builder shows signs of encouragement to the helper, the latter cannot connect it to the word, since everything sounds muffled to him. Even saying 'slab' while pointing to a slab, or saying 'block' while pointing at one does not work, because the helper cannot hear the actual words, just the imperative intonation.

After a while, the builder gives up and changes the game: he shouts 'slab' and if the helper brings a block instead, he keeps shouting 'slab' until the helper, randomly, brings a slab. [08.04.2018]

Searle's Chinese Room argument and all arguments of that kind are heavily based on the notion of sameness, which is seen (hidden) as a trivial pre-requisite. "[L]et J be Jones's Twin in a Twin-Earth scenario" (Chomsky). In each of those thought experiments, the sameness can be assessed only by the observer that does not know upfront that he deals with a changeling.

Thus such experiments assume, without explicitly articulating, features of observer allowing him/her/it to pass the judgement. The observer does not need to be human. For example, the discriminator part of GAN (Generative Adversarial Networks) is trained specifically as such an observer.

... [...-09.12.2017]

Economics of frugality since Occam's razor: the settled afraid of accumulating, since they constantly prepare themselves to become nomadic: refugees accused of being economic migrants and modern nomadic workforce not differentiated enough from refugees (on purpose).

... [09.12.2017]

A poetic metaphor, as long as one can comprehend it at all, can always be deduced post-factum through the Groupe μ semantic arithmetics through the subtraction and addition of semes. However, it is not a primary operation in producing metaphors - whenever it is, it leads to standard or dead ones like 'lion' for a king through the seme of 'courage'.

The metaphor is a derivative and relatively trivial product of the underlying act of establishing a sememe's composing semes, choosing among them a subset of interest, and then moving through the double step of two synecdoches to a new word group sharing the seme subset.

This presumes that a word acts as a container of its semes, even its whole content has not been revealed or even fixed - and it always works post factum, where 'post factum' means that a metaphor is understood.

However, metaphor as something poetic, emergent, and mysterious happens if the word is seen as having no content, but only relationships and valencies through its usage, which, although limited by the language possibilities, is not defined (like a dictionary entry), but is open-ended, just like usage of the letters of alphabet (i.e. 'semantics answers to pragmatics'). Those usage valencies do not get enumerated, but performed as pragmatic acts and its semes get produced and radiated (although not constructed) in those acts rather than stored in the content of the word, the latter being virtually non-existent. The king's courage is in having charged singlemindedly at the enemy with his eyes burning bright and so is the lion's. It is different from the courage of a jester speaking truth to the king. (And not so are modern leaders who, despite sometimes possibly being fine humans, never are compared to the lions.) The courage is understood in the process of its happening.


i have nothing to say

by ignoring it, you are acknowledging it

(modern paradox|engine of private voice)


vsevolod vlaskine : notes : 2014 -