Not performing reduction is a form of reduction. [13.07.2014]
Deleuze and Turing self-test
Reading Deleuze's Difference and Repetition. As they would say in information
technologies, his texts are write-only. Essentially, you produce this kind of
texts, when you already are thinking as Deleuze. Reading his books is a Turing
self-test: if I understand it, I am Deleuze of sorts. The trumpet produces
trumpet sounds. Deleuze produces Deleuze texts. Deleuze is a production machine
of texts that were not meant to be read. They were not written to be understood,
but forensics to be performed on them in attempt to reconstruct the operation of
(Strangely, we often call a machine something that produces output that is not
connected to its internal workings in some intentional and tractable way. The
bird shit is linked to its digestion. The human speach has communicative or
emotional component. I don't know much about him, but possibly Deleuze wanted
to be perceived or self-identified as a machine, partly due to his and Guattari's
neo-modernist ideas and partly due to his life-long debilitating illness.)
Once you keep in mind what he means, it all makes perfect, lucid, and highly
pragmatic sense. Then, two pages later you lose traction again and keep skidding
on the next few. You may say it's because the man is above your grade. But then
- sometimes - he gives examples. Examples are there to make things more clear,
if less theoretical. However, say, the illustrative or argumentative force of
most of his abundant examples from mathematics is lost, because the basic
mathematical facts are obfuscated with convoluted tortured words.
As Wittgenstein said: what can be said at all, can be said clearly. But Deleuze
did not like Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein did not mind. He was dead by then. [22.08.2015]
Artificial intelligence singularity will be achieved unnoticed. It will not be
passing Turing test. It will be Wittgenstein's lion: Wenn ein Loewe sprechen koennte,
wir koennten ihn nicht verstehen. We would not even understand that he is speaking.
Suppose, Chomsky says: only the language of the individual whose mind can
generate utterances (I-Language) is worth studying in linuguistics. Because
here is the mind and here is the language it produces. No mind - no
language. With the tacit assumption that somehow there are minds and they
directly produce language with nothing in between. Because we can depart
from the principle of isolation: you need only mind (physiologically wired
with language-learning capability) to speak a language. And (I suppose) since
we have privileged access to our minds, we can immediately observe that
words and phrases are produced right in our minds. However, this immediacy
proves no more than saying: I see a tree therefore there is nothing between
me and the tree. Rather there is nothing between me and the tree that would
prevent me from seeing it or between me and the orchestra that prevents me
from hearing it. However, today we know that there should be something between
me and the orchestra: the air, which I don't see or hear, but without which I
would not hear anything. The perceived immediate connection between mind and speech
is meaningless in the causal sense. The gap between them can be "material"
or semiotic: an extra medium between mind and speech (e.g. of social nature) can
transcend confines of an individual as well as the isolation not necessarily
guarantees the adequate semiotic level: brain as a collection of cells or
of atoms seems to be necessary and sufficient for speech, but it leaves too
big a causality gap that would prevent a meaningful linguistic inquiry. [26.07.2014]
Suppose (as one book suggests) that in Wittgenstein's builder language game
the helper does not understand the builder's language. Moreover, the builder's
language sounds garbled to him. All what the helper has learned is that when the
builder says something that sounds like a command, he better bring something:
a block or a slab.
The builder shouts 'slab', but the helper may bring a block instead.
Sometimes the helper brings a slab, but when the builder shows signs
of encouragement to the helper, the latter cannot connect it to the word,
since everything sounds muffled to him. Even saying 'slab' while pointing to
a slab, or saying 'block' while pointing at one does not work, because the
helper cannot hear the actual words, just the imperative intonation.
After a while, the builder gives up and changes the game: he shouts 'slab'
and if the helper brings a block instead, he keeps shouting 'slab' until
the helper, randomly, brings a slab. [08.04.2018]
Searle's Chinese Room argument and all arguments of that kind are heavily based
on the notion of sameness, which is seen (hidden) as a trivial pre-requisite.
"[L]et J be Jones's Twin in a Twin-Earth scenario" (Chomsky). In each of those
thought experiments, the sameness can be assessed only by the observer that does
not know upfront that he deals with a changeling.
Thus such experiments assume, without explicitly articulating, features of observer
allowing him/her/it to pass the judgement. The observer does not need to be human.
For example, the discriminator part of GAN (Generative Adversarial Networks) is
trained specifically as such an observer.
Economy of frugality since Occam's razor: the settled afraid of accumulating, since they constantly
prepare themselves to become nomadic: refugees accused of being economic migrants and modern
nomadic workforce not differentiated enough from refugees.